Location: Yale School of Management, Forum (Room 1400)
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols have grown to manage nearly $100 billion of assets as of 2024. These protocols aim to build transparent, permissionless, and non-custodial financial systems. Examples of such systems include automated market makers, which facilitate exchange of digital tokens, decentralized lending protocols, which allow for permissionless borrowing, and on-chain auctions.
The design and analysis of these systems raises several important questions that sit at the core of economics and computation: How secure are these systems? What are the incentives of the various participants? How can these protocols be designed optimally? These questions have been formulated and studied by the EC community under several research umbrellas, including selfish mining, constant function market makers, and miner extractable value (MEV).
This non-proceedings half-day workshop aims to promote research on distributed ledger-based financial protocols and economic mechanisms.
Ciamac Moallemi (Columbia University)
Tim Roughgarden (Columbia University & a16z crypto)
Submission deadline: June 7
Author notification: June 17 (updated)
Workshop date: July 8, morning
Location: Yale School of Management, Forum (Room 1400)
Infrastructure (8:30am - 10:00am)
Keynote: MEV, Blockspace Allocation, and Tullock Contests (Tim Roughgarden)
Double Auctions for Cross-blockchain Resource Allocation (Matheus VX Ferreira)
Decentralization of Ethereum's Builder Market (Fan Zhang)
Multidimensional Blockchain Fees are (Essentially) Optimal (Guillermo Angeris)
Beyond Multi-Dimensional Fee Markets (Naveen Durvasula)
Break (10am - 10:30am)
Decentralized Finance & Applications (10:30am - 12pm)
Keynote: Loss-Versus-Fair: Efficiency of Dutch Auctions on Blockchains (Ciamac Moallemi)
Optimal Automated Market Makers: Differentiable Economics and Strong Duality (Zhou Fan)
A General Theory of Liquidity Provisioning for Automated Market Makers (Adithya Bhaskara)
Automated Exchange Economies (Ariel Zetlin-Jones)
Data Independent Order Policy Enforcement: Limitations and Solutions (Sarisht Wadhwa)
Lunch (12pm - 1pm)
Poster Session (1pm - 2pm)
Thinking Fast and Slow: Data-Driven Adaptive DeFi Borrow-Lending Protocol (Mahsa Bastankhah)
Adaptive Curves for Optimally Efficient Market Making (Viraj Nadkarni)
No Trade in a Blockchain (Spyros Galanis)
Quantifying Price Improvement in Order Flow Auctions (Brad Bachu)
We encourage both theoretical and empirical work that provides new insights related to existing protocols, or that propose new designs for new protocols. Topics of particular interest include, but are not limited to, the following:
Transaction fee mechanism design
Censorship resistance
Mechanism design for block production (proposer builder separation, execution tickets, etc.)
Economics of staking/restaking
AMM/DEX design
Decentralized lending
Miner Extractable Value (MEV)
Market microstructure in DeFi
Market making/liquidity provision in DeFi
Please submit in a single column format with size 12pt font. Reviewers will carefully evaluate the first 15 pages of each submission (including cover page, figures, tables; excluding references and appendices). Longer papers are accepted but may not be read in their entirety when making decisions. The cover page must contain the paper’s title, the names, affiliations, and email addresses of the authors, and a one or two paragraph abstract which concisely summarizes the paper’s contributions. Please submit your papers in a PDF format on this Google form.
Tarun Chitra (Gauntlet)
Theo Diamandis (MIT & Bain Capital Crypto)
Kshitij Kulkarni (UC Berkeley & Gauntlet)
Mallesh Pai (Rice & Consensys)
Max Resnick (Consensys)